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Michael Pal*
Luka Ryder-Bunting**

Citizenship and the First-Generation
Limitation in Canada

This article considers the current Canadian regime for citizenship by descent and
what is known as the “first-generation limitation.” In 2009, Parliament legislated
to limit the transmission of citizenship by descent. Known as the “first-generation
limitation,” the new rules mean that a Canadian parent is only entitled to pass on
their citizenship to their children born abroad if the parent themselves became a
citizen by birth inside Canada or by naturalization. In other words, if an individual
acquired Canadian citizenship by descent, they are not entitled to pass on their
citizenship to their children unless those children are born in Canada. The imposition
of the first-generation limitation was controversial, as it is much more restrictive than
the previous Canadian rules or those in many comparable jurisdictions. This article
outlines the operation of the current Canadian rules around citizenship, analyzes
the first-generation limitation, and sets out relevant international comparisons. In
evaluating the current legal regime in light of debates about the principles of jus
soli, jus sanguinis, and jus nexi, we conclude that the current legal regime is overly
restrictive. There are potential alternatives that would better meet the underlying
values of Canadian citizenship law. Building on the foundations of jus soli, jus
sanguinis, and jus nexi, we have identified three main policy options that respond to
the tensions raised by the indefinite transmission of citizenship by descent in Canada:
(1) a parental residency exception; (2) an adapted naturalization application, and (3)
a birth registration exception. In our assessment, any of these three options would
be preferable to the status quo or the pre-2009 rules.
Dans le présent article, nous examinons le régime canadien actuel en matière de
citoyenneté par filiation et ce que l’on appelle la « limitation à la première génération ».
En 2009, le Parlement a légiféré pour limiter la transmission de la citoyenneté par
filiation. Connues sous le nom de « limitation de la première génération », les
nouvelles règles signifient qu’un parent canadien n’a le droit de transmettre sa
citoyenneté à ses enfants nés à l’étranger que si le parent est lui-même devenu
citoyen par naissance au Canada ou par naturalisation. En d’autres termes, si une
personne a acquis la citoyenneté canadienne par filiation, elle n’a pas le droit de
transmettre sa citoyenneté à ses enfants, sauf si ces derniers sont nés au Canada.
L’imposition de cette limite de la première génération a suscité la controverse, car elle
est beaucoup plus restrictive que les règles canadiennes précédentes ou que celles
de nombreuses juridictions comparables. Dans le présent article, nous décrivons
le fonctionnement des règles canadiennes actuelles en matière de citoyenneté,
analysons la limite de la première génération et établissons des comparaisons
internationales pertinentes. En évaluant le régime juridique actuel à la lumière des
débats sur les principes du jus soli (droit du sol), du jus sanguinis (droit du sang)
et du jus nexi (droit par filiation), nous concluons que le régime juridique actuel est
trop restrictif. Il existe d’autres possibilités qui répondraient mieux aux valeurs sousjacentes du droit de la citoyenneté canadienne. En nous appuyant sur les fondements
du jus soli, du jus sanguinis et du jus nexi, nous avons identifié trois grandes options
politiques qui répondent aux tensions soulevées par la transmission indéfinie de
la citoyenneté par filiation au Canada : (1) une exception de résidence parentale ;
(2) une demande de naturalisation adaptée, et (3) une exception d’enregistrement
des naissances. Selon nous, chacune de ces trois options serait préférable au statu
quo ou aux règles antérieures à 2009.
* Michael Pal is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, at the
University of Ottawa.
** Luka Ryder-Bunting is an Associate at Koskie Minsky LLP in Toronto.
The authors would like to thank the Canadian American Bar Association for their generous
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Introduction
National citizenship is a multi-faceted concept involving the “linking of
an individual to a nation-state.”1 It denotes a specific legal status, political
membership in a community, and is an important aspect of individual and
1.
Patrick Weil, “From Conditional to Secured and Sovereign: The New Strategic Link Between
the Citizen and the Nation-State in a Globalized World” (2011) 9:3-4 Intl J Constitutional L 615.
In this paper, the term citizenship is used to denote national citizenship. Some scholars challenge
whether citizenship attaches only at the level of nation-state or may be asserted to exist at various
other levels of community organization. See e.g. Linda Bosniak, “Critical Reflections on ‘Citizenship’
as a Progressive Aspiration” in Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl, and Karl Klare, eds,
Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2004) [Bosniak, “Critical Reflections”].
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collective identity.2 It has even been called the “right to have rights,”3
given the legal entitlements that flow to an individual from its acquisition.4
Citizenship also serves as a significant determinant of life opportunities.
Because the socio-economic characteristics of states vary so dramatically,
the rules around acquisition of citizenship serve to “define access to
certain resources, benefits, protections, decision-making processes, and
opportunity-enhancing institutions reserved primarily to those defined as
right-holders.”5 As a result, citizenship can be understood to have a dual
nature: inclusive and emancipatory for some and exclusionary for others.6
Globally, citizenship and its benefits are still largely transmitted at
birth according to two distinct sets of rules with different historical lineages
and contemporary impacts. The principle of jus soli assigns citizenship at
birth to anyone born within the territory of a state. The citizenship of the
parent(s) is irrelevant to the operation of jus soli. Jus sanguinis, by contrast,
explicitly transmits citizenship to children based on the citizenship of their
parent(s). Entitlement to citizenship under jus sanguinis turns on descent.
Both jus soli and jus sanguinis rely on facts about an individual at birth as
the basis for distributing citizenship. Canada does not exclusively adopt
any one approach. Canadian citizenship can be acquired by: 1) birth in
Canada consistent with the principle of jus soli; 2) birth outside Canada to
a Canadian citizen in accordance with jus sanguinis; or 3) naturalization.
This article considers the current Canadian regime for citizenship
by descent and what is known as the “first-generation limitation.” In
2009, Parliament legislated to limit the transmission of citizenship by
descent. Known as the “first-generation limitation,” the new rules meant
that a Canadian parent was only entitled to pass on their citizenship to
their children born abroad if the parent themselves became a citizen by
2.
Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on
Citizenship Theory” (1994) 104:2 Ethics 352.
3.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1948).
See also Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86 (1958).
4.
Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006) at 34-35. See also Sarah Song, “Rethinking Citizenship Through
Alienage and Birthright Privilege: Bosniak and Shachar’s Critiques of Liberal Citizenship” (2011) 9:1
Issues in Legal Scholarship 1 [Song, “Rethinking Citizenship”].
5.
Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2009) at 7. See also Joseph H Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay
(Boston: MIT Press Cambridge, 2010).
6.
Christian Joppke, “Citizenship in Immigration States” in Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene
Bloemraad & Maarten Vink, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2018) at 385-388. See also Bosniak, “Critical Reflections,” supra note 1. These approaches
are contrary to that of TH Marshall, who famously set out citizenship as embodying a process of
progressive development: TH Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1950).
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birth inside Canada or by naturalization. In other words, if an individual
acquired Canadian citizenship by descent, they are not entitled to pass on
their citizenship to their children unless those children are born in Canada.
The imposition of the first-generation limitation was controversial, as it is
much more restrictive than the previous Canadian rules or those in many
comparable jurisdictions. It introduced a differential set of rights among
classes of citizens.7 Amendments in 2017 reduced the risk that the firstgeneration limitation could result in statelessness.8 While the harshest
edges of the policy have been shaved off, the fundamental soundness of
the limitation must still be interrogated.
The dilemma that the first-generation limitation sought to address can
be framed relatively succinctly. Indefinite transmission of citizenship by
descent to the children of multiple generations born abroad risks including
members who may have little meaningful connection to the political
community. Restricting the transmission of citizenship, however, may
arbitrarily exclude individuals and, in doing so, harm their life chances.
The excluded individuals may in fact have a genuine connection to Canada
and/or be those whom Canada would otherwise be seeking to attract.
Underlying this dilemma is a tension between the view of citizenship as a
category distributing largely equal, formal rights to members that ought to
be accessible and the “gate-keeping function”9 of citizenship reflecting the
political community’s “right to exclude”10 and to define itself.11
Prominent scholars have questioned birth location and parental
citizenship as being, at times, arbitrary measures of whether a person has
a connection to a country and ought to be afforded citizenship. Many have
called for other approaches to citizenship transmission and acquisition,
such as the argument in favour of a third option beyond jus soli and jus
sanguinis called “jus nexi.” Under jus nexi, the acquisition of citizenship
requires establishing some kind of real and substantial connection to the

7.
Citizens unable to transmit their citizenship in the same way as their fellow citizens could be said
to be in a state of “semi-citizenship”: Elizabeth Cohen, “Dilemmas of Representation, Citizenship, and
Semi-Citizenship” (2014) 58 St Louis ULJ 1047; Elizabeth Cohen, Semi-Citizenship in Democratic
Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
8.
Marietta Brennan & Miriam Cohen, “Citizenship by Descent: How Canada’s One-Generation
Rule Fails to Comply with International Legal Norms” (2018) 22:10 Intl JHR 1302.
9.
Ayelet Shachar & Ran Hirschl, “Citizenship as Inherited Property” (2007) 35:3 Political Theory
253 at 265.
10. The idea that a state ought to be able to exclude members from its polity and associated benefits
flowing from citizenship is frequently challenged. See e.g. Sarah Song, “Why Does the State Have the
Right to Control Immigration?” (2017) 57 J Immigration, Emigration & Migration 3.
11. Shachar & Hirschl, supra note 9 at 267.
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state,12 with advocates framing it as a more just alternative13 in determining
citizenship than the sometimes arbitrary measure of circumstances of
birth.14 A robust debate has erupted about whether jus nexi would exclude
many who would otherwise be automatically entitled to citizenship by
descent or birth location.15
The choice between jus soli, jus sanguinis, and now jus nexi is
a consequential one. The rules around citizenship acquisition and
transmission establish whether an individual obtains the opportunities and
status that come with citizenship. Globalization has further heightened the
stakes. The processes of globalization undermine the common assumption
that there is or even should be an overlap between residence or descent with
citizenship. The international migration that has accompanied globalization
creates, in the words of Rainer Baübock, “a mismatch between citizenship
and the territorial scope of legitimate authority” including “citizens living
outside the country whose government is supposed to be accountable to
them and inside a country whose government is not accountable to them.”16
Canada is far from immune from having to reckon with the implications of
globalization on citizenship, given the twin migrations into Canada by noncitizens and out of Canada by citizens moving abroad.17 The implications
of a “mismatch” between citizenship and territory manifest themselves in
Canada in the debate about the first-generation limitation.18
This article sets out the various considerations involved in setting
law and policy around the first-generation limitation. Related and
important topics in the literature on citizenship and migration, such as the
rights and legal status of long-term, non-citizen residents,19 or whether
citizenship itself is an exclusionary concept,20 are beyond the scope of
12. Shachar, supra note 5.
13. Shachar & Hirschl, supra note 9.
14. Rainer Bauböck, “Stakeholder Citizenship: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” in Delivering
Citizenship (Gutersloh: The Transatlantic Council on Migration, 2008).
15. Song, “Rethinking Citizenship,” supra note 4 at 9-19; Noah Novogrodsky, “The Use and Abuse
of Jus Nexi” (2012) 7:2 The Ethics Forum 50.
16. Bauböck, supra note 14 at 31.
17. Audrey Macklin argues that there is even a “kind of immigration exceptionalism [which] dilutes
the rule of law in relation to non-citizens.” Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship, Non-Citizenship, and the
Rule of Law” (2018) 69:1 UNBLJ 19. Available on SSRN.com: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3666111. Last accessed July 16, 2021.
18. Jamie Chai Yun Liew & Donald Galloway, Immigration Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015)
at 45.
19. See e.g. Hiroshi Motomura, “The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the
Law” (2010) 59:8 Duke LJ 1723. See also Linda Bosniak, “Territorial Presence as a Grounds for
Claims: Some Reflections” (2020) 14:2 Nordic J Applied Ethics 53.
20. See e.g. Bosniak, “Critical Reflections,” supra note 1. See also Joseph H Carens, “Aliens and
Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” (1987) 49:2 Rev Politics 251.
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this article. There are potential constitutional implications of state drawing
distinctions among citizens, including a potential violation of the right to
equality in s 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.21 We
also leave for another day the detailed argument necessary to establish the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the first-generation limitation,
given the rapidly shifting case law.22
In the sections that follow, this article outlines the operation of the
current Canadian rules around citizenship, analyzes the first-generation
limitation, sets out relevant international comparisons, and then addresses
a variety of reform-minded policies that could be pursued. In evaluating
the current legal regime in light of debates about the principles of jus soli,
jus sanguinis, and jus nexi, we conclude that the current legal regime
is overly restrictive. There are potential alternatives that would better
meet the underlying values of Canadian citizenship law. Building on the
foundations of jus soli, jus sanguinis, and jus nexi, we have identified three
main policy options that respond to the tensions raised by the indefinite
transmission of citizenship by descent in Canada: (1) a parental residency
exception; (2) an adapted naturalization application; and (3) a birth
registration exception. In our assessment, any of these three options would
be preferable to the status quo or the pre-2009 rules.
I.

Citizenship and the Citizenship Act

1. The operation of the Citizenship Act
This section outlines the legal rules surrounding the transmission and
acquisition of citizenship. Federal legislation provides for citizenship by
birth in Canada, by birth outside to a Canadian citizen, and by naturalization.
Sub-section II (ii) then uses that discussion to analyze how “citizenship” is
used as a concept in Canadian law.
a. Citizenship by birth in Canada (jus soli)
The Citizenship Act23 (the “Act”) governs citizenship law in Canada.
Section 3(1)(a) of the Act guarantees citizenship to everyone born in
Canada. This is limited only by s 3(2), which excludes foreign diplomats,
consular officers, anyone in the service of the former two categories, and
employees of a United Nations agency or similar organization. The scope
of this provision was recently addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada

21. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
22. See Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28.
23. Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29.
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in Vavilov v Minister of Citizenship.24 The majority of the Court recognized
that: “…Canada affords citizenship in accordance both with the principle
of jus soli, the acquisition of citizenship through birth regardless of the
parents’ nationality, and with that of jus sanguinis, the acquisition of
citizenship by descent, that is through a parent.”25
The facts of Vavilov are dramatic, and it is a rare instance of the
Supreme Court taking up core aspects of citizenship. Mr. Vavilov was born
in Canada to parents eventually revealed to be Russian citizens employed
by their government as spies. Vavilov received Canadian citizenship on
the basis of jus soli, but it was eventually revoked under s 3(2)(a) of the
Citizenship Act by the registrar of citizenship. Mr. Vavilov challenged that
administrative decision. The Supreme Court concluded that the revocation
by the registrar was unreasonable as a matter of administrative law and
statutory interpretation. The Court upheld the decision by the Federal
Court of Appeal quashing the decision of the registrar.
While notable for its restatement of the principles of judicial review
in administrative law, Vavilov reiterates the foundational importance of
citizenship. The majority of the Court interpreted the relevant statute so as
to enhance access to citizenship. The majority cited the opinion of Justice
Iacobucci in Benner v Canada (Secretary of State),26 stating, “I cannot
imagine an interest more fundamental to full membership in Canadian
society than Canadian Citizenship.”27 Given the interests at stake, the
exclusion in s 3(2) was construed narrowly by the Court in Mr. Vavilov’s
favour. The exclusion was interpreted to only apply to the children of
individuals who receive diplomatic immunities (or the people in their
service). Offspring of individuals not identified by Canada as diplomats or
in the service of a diplomat therefore benefit from the principle of jus soli,
even though there were national security considerations and deception by
the parents.
b. Citizenship by birth outside Canada to a Canadian parent (jus
sanguinis)
Individuals born outside Canada are also entitled to citizenship by descent
if one or more of their parents is a Canadian citizen, by virtue of s 3(1)
(b) of the Act. The provision states that, “a person is a citizen if…the
person was born outside Canada after 14 February 1977, and at the time

24.
25.
26.
27.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov].
Ibid at para 178 per the majority opinion.
Benner v Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 SCR 358 at paras 68, 143.
Vavilov, supra note 24 at para 191.
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of his birth one of his parents, other than a parent who adopted him, was a
citizen.” This provision gives life to the principle of jus sanguinis.
This guarantee is qualified by s 3(3), which limits citizenship by
descent to the first generation born abroad. The limitation is the result of
the passage by Parliament of Bill C-37, An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act,
which came into force on 17 April 2009. This “first-generation limitation”
as it has come to be known means that a person born outside Canada on or
after 17 April 2009, will not become a citizen unless one of their parents is
a Canadian citizen otherwise than by descent. Put differently, a Canadian
citizen is only entitled to pass on their citizenship to their children born
outside of Canada if the parent became a citizen by birth inside Canada or
by naturalization.
Take the following example. Person A is born in the United States
but becomes a citizen of Canada at birth due to the citizenship of their
parents. They live most of their lives in Canada before moving back to the
United States for school. Person A then has a child in the United States
with an American spouse. In this scenario, Person A’s child would not be
granted citizenship by descent, despite their parent’s links to the country.
In contrast, if Person A or their partner became a citizen by birth in Canada
or through naturalization, their child would become a Canadian citizen at
birth despite being born abroad. The rule does not consider the amount
of time the parent has spent in Canada or how they retain a connection
to the country. It only considers the method by which the parent received
citizenship.
The legislation builds in safeguards for specific Canadians. The firstgeneration limitation does not apply to children of individuals working
abroad in the Canadian public service at the child’s birth.28 The public
services enumerated in the Act are the Canadian Armed Forces, the federal
public administration, and the public service of a province. A child born
to parents working in the public service is also enabled to pass on their
citizenship to their children born abroad.29 That is to say, a child born
abroad whose Canadian parent is employed in the public service is treated
as born inside Canada or naturalized for the purposes of the first-generation
rule, and as such, the limitation does not apply to their eventual children.
These provisions echo past exceptions in the Canada Elections Act
related to voting in federal elections by Canadian citizens living outside
the country for long periods of time. The legislation banned voting by
those abroad for more than five years but created categories of exceptions
28.
29.

Citizenship Act, supra note 23, s 3(5)(a).
Ibid, s 3(5)(b).
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for Canadians working for the Canadian state abroad or select international
organizations that Canada is a member of, such as the United Nations.
These exceptions were rendered moot by the passage of Bill C-76, which
eliminated the five-year rule.30 The Supreme Court of Canada eventually
held in Frank v Canada31 in 2019 that the five-year rule violated the right
to vote granted to all citizens in s 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (the Charter).
The rules prior to 2009 addressed what constitutes a “substantial
connection.” Under the pre-2009 rules, the second or subsequent generation
born abroad was considered a Canadian citizen. Still, it would lose that
status if they did not apply for retention by age 28 or failed to meet the
application requirements. If an applicant had resided in Canada for the year
preceding the application, they were entitled to retain their citizenship. If
they had not, they had to demonstrate a substantial connection to Canada
in order for the application to be accepted.
The definition of “substantial connection” was found in the Citizenship
Regulations. A substantial connection could be demonstrated in two ways.
First, one was considered to have a substantial connection to Canada if
they worked abroad for the Canadian Forces, the RCMP, or the United
Nations as a Canadian representative. Secondly, one could demonstrate
a substantial connection by having an adequate knowledge of Canada,
one of its official languages, and the privileges and responsibilities of
citizenship, as well as having lived in Canada for one year since the
age of 14 either with a family member or at a Canadian secondary or
post-secondary institution.32 There was some administrative confusion
surrounding this law and its application, including that it was poorly
advertised to individuals who needed to apply. It also provides significant
discretion to the bureaucracy, which has not always been advantageous to
rights claimants under the citizenship regime or immigration law.33

30. On the link between voting rights and citizenship acquisition in Canada, see Andrew Griffiths
and Robert Vineberg’s brief to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs: Andrew
Griffith & Robert Vineberg, “C-76 Non-Resident Voting Rights” (last visited 15 June 2022), online
(pdf): House of Commons Canada <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/PROC/Brief/
BR9886548/br-external/GriffithAndrew-e.pdf> [perma.cc/6LK7-M3EA]. See also Michael Pal,
“Evaluating Bill C-76: The Elections Modernization Act” (2019) 13:1 JPPL 171 at 176-177.
31. Frank v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 1 [Frank].
32. Citizenship Regulations, SOR/93-246, s 16.
33. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th)
193.
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c. Citizenship by grant (naturalization)
In addition to birth in Canada or outside Canada to a Canadian parent in
some circumstances, an individual over the age of 18 can be apply for
a grant of citizenship under s 5 of the Act, known as naturalization. An
applicant must fulfill certain requirements to have their naturalization
application accepted. The applicant must be a permanent resident, have
been physically present in Canada for at least 1,095 days in the five
years directly preceding the application,34 and have filed taxes in three of
those five years. Individuals between ages 18-55 must have an “adequate
knowledge” of English or French and understand the “responsibilities and
privileges of citizenship.”35 The Act temporarily or permanently excludes
applicants from a grant of citizenship on the basis of criminality or national
security considerations.36
One of the concerns raised about the first-generation limitation was
the possibility that an individual could be rendered “stateless,” if unable
to gain access to the citizenship of their Canadian parents and denied
citizenship in the country where they currently live. A grant of citizenship
is therefore available for individuals who have Canadian parents but who
are excluded from citizenship by the first-generation limitation and would
be stateless, but for the grant of citizenship.37 Between 2010 and 2017,
384 people had received a discretionary grant.38 The vast majority of the
recipients were “Lost Canadians,” a group who lost their citizenship due
to historical citizenship legislation deemed inconsistent with modern legal
and ethical norms.39
2. Defining citizenship in Canada
The starting point for considering the first-generation limitation is
how citizenship is set out in Canadian law. Citizenship does not have a
comprehensive statutory definition in Canada.40 It is also not defined in the
34. See Citizenship Act, supra note 23, s 5(1)(c). Days towards the 1,095 day requirement are
calculated as a full day while the person is a permanent resident, while days during which the person
was a temporary resident or protected person count as a half-day (ibid, s 5(1.001)(c)).
35. Ibid, s 5(1)(c)-(d).
36. See ibid, ss 22 (criminality), s 19 (national security).
37. Ibid, s 5(5).
38. See Memorandum from Deputy Minister Marta Morgan to the Minister of Immigration, Refugees
and Citizenship Canada Ahmed Hussen (15 February 2017) at 2, retrieved by access to information
request pursuant to the Access to Information Act. The precise period was from 2010 to 15 February
2017.
39. See Ajay Parasram, “Us and Them: The Plumbing and Poetry of Citizenship Policy and the
Canadians Abroad” (2010) Asia Pacific Project Paper Series No 10-03, online (pdf): Asia Pacific
Foundation of Canada <www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/filefield/UsandThem.pdf> [https://
perma.cc/YB5J-YXQN ].
40. See Liew & Galloway, supra note 18 at 45.
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Canadian Constitution, despite the fact that various rights in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms are granted on the basis of citizenship.
The Citizenship Act governs who has the right to citizenship and what
conditions must be fulfilled to become a citizen. The terms “citizen” and
“national” are combined in Canadian law, rather than distinct.41
The courts have often pointed toward some significant connection to
Canada as the justification or basis for assigning citizenship.42 Requirements
for acquiring citizenship—such as residency, birth in Canada or being born
to Canadian parents—can be understood as proxies for a connection to
Canada. The potential issue for any proxy is whether it accurately captures
the intended facts about an individual. Arbitrariness would exist if some
individuals without a meaningful connection are granted citizenship
automatically while others with such a connection are denied it.
Citizens are specifically afforded constitutional rights unavailable to
non-citizens. Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the
rights to vote and to stand as a candidate for federal or provincial office in
s 343 and mobility rights in s 644 are granted exclusively to citizens. The right
to vote includes the right to “meaningful participation”45 and “effective
representation.”46 Mobility rights are perhaps as important as ever, given
restrictions on international, interprovincial, and even intra-provincial
movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Section 6(1) protects the
right of citizens to enter, leave, and remain in Canada.47 Sub-sections 6(2)(3) guarantee inter-provincial movement, including taking up residence
or moving for work, to citizens and also permanent residents.48 Minority
language rights in s 23 are also the preserve of citizens. The fact that the
constitutional text guarantees these rights but that they are dependant on
specification in the Act makes them vulnerable to restriction by Parliament
in ways that those rights and freedoms possessed by “everyone” are not.
41. Taylor v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1053 at para 61 [Taylor].
42. See Canada (Attorney General) v Mckenna (CA) (1998), [1999] 1 FC 401 at para 61, 167 DLR
(4th) 488.
43. See supra note 21 (“Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of
the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein”);
Frank, supra note 31
44. See supra note 21, s 6(1) (“Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave
Canada”), s 6(2) (“Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent
resident of Canada has the right (a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and (b) to pursue
the gaining of a livelihood in any province”); Black v Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 SCR 591, 58
DLR (4th) 317; United States of America v Cotroni, [1989] 1 SCR 1469, 48 CCC (3d) 193.
45. See Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 37.
46. Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask), [1991] 2 SCR 158, 81 DLR (4th) 16.
47. Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47 at para 18.
48. See Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v Richardson (1997), [1998] 3 SCR 157, 166 DLR (4th) 1.
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This vulnerability is a relevant consideration when assessing the merits
of citizenship acquisition rules. Citizenship law directly affects capacity
of individuals to claim rights under the Charter. Citizenship also entails
some forms of preferential treatment from the state.49
The Act guarantees the same rights to all citizens flowing from their
status.50 Generally, one does not lose their rights against the Canadian
state due to changes in residence. In striking down the provisions of the
Canada Elections Act that barred Canadians living abroad for more than
five years from voting in Frank v Canada,51 Chief Justice Wagner wrote
for the majority that:
…the world has changed. Canadians are both able and encouraged to
live abroad, but they maintain close connections with Canada in doing
so. The right to vote is no longer tied to the ownership of property
and bestowed only on select members of society. And citizenship, not
residence, defines our political community and underpins the right to
vote.52

This passage highlights the degree to which citizenship, as a legal category,
is intended to ensure formal equality among members of the community.
II. The first-generation limitation: citizenship by descent and Canadians
abroad
1. Canadians abroad
Limitations to citizenship by descent can potentially have a significant
impact given the quantity of Canadians living abroad. Determining
exactly how large the Canadian population is globally can be difficult,
as the Government of Canada does not keep exact statistics on this point.
The Asia Pacific Foundation released a report in 2009 that estimated
approximately 2.8 million Canadians living abroad as of 2006.53 This
report represented, at the time, nine per cent of Canadians.54 According
to this estimate, the country with the most Canadian expats is the United
States, with a population of one million.55 A travel guide for Canadians

49. See Lavoie v Canada, 2002 SCC 23 (favouring citizens in federal public service hiring practices
is a justifiable breach of s 15 equality rights).
50. See Citizenship Act, supra note 23, s 6.
51. See supra note 31.
52. Ibid at para 35.
53. See Don DeVoretz & Kenny Zhang, “Canadians Abroad: Canada’s Global Asset” (2011) at 3,
online (pdf): Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada <www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/canadians_
abroad_final.pdf> [perma.cc/YZ5G-SGFA].
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid at 4.

Citizenship and the First-Generation Limitation in Canada

13

released by Global Affairs Canada in 2013 references “about three million
Canadians” living abroad.56
Estimating precisely how many Canadians born abroad are deprived
of citizenship by the limitation is also difficult. In a brief submitted to the
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration during debates on
Bill C-6, the Canadian Expat Association estimated that roughly 50,000
potential Canadians are born abroad each year, and that somewhere between
4109 and 57,190 children of Canadians had been deprived of citizenship
between 2009 and April 2016.57 These numbers are approximate, but it
would appear safe to assume that the 2009 amendments restricting the
transmission of Canadian citizenship to second and subsequent generations
affected thousands.
2. Bill C-37
Jus sanguinis is now more restrictive than it has been since citizenship’s
creation in Canada, largely due to Bill C-37, An Act to amend the
Citizenship Act. The Bill repealed the requirement that Canadians born
abroad apply for citizenship retention by age 28. Bill C-37 did not affect
those who already had citizenship when that the law came into force in
2009. Individuals who were the second or subsequent generation born
abroad and were citizens at the time the provision came into force, but
had not yet applied for citizenship retention, remained Canadian citizens.58
The first-generation limitation was intended to address the unlimited
transmission of citizenship to successive generations born abroad who lack
a substantive connection to Canada. It appeared to have been motivated by
a view that the indefinite transmission of citizenship by descent pursuant
to jus sanguinis would arbitrarily include as citizens individuals with
only a tenuous or superficial link to Canada.59 There were clearly very
practical and, indeed, political concerns at play as well. For example, the
56. See Living Abroad: A Canadian’s Guide to Working, Studying, Volunteering or Retiring in a
Foreign Country, (2013) at 2, online (pdf): Global Affairs Canada <travel.gc.ca/docs/publications/
living_abroad-en.pdf> perma.cc/3DZV-VJGF].
57. See Randall Emery & Allan Nichols, “Welcoming Canadians Home, Embracing Global
Opportunities” (2016) at 11-12, online (pdf): House of Commons <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/
Committee/421/CIMM/Brief/BR8221904/br-external/CanadianExpatAssociation-e.pdf > [perma.cc/
ULJ9-YRH6].
58. Penny Becklumb, “Bill C-37: An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act (Legislative Summary)” (9
January 2008, revised 26 February 2008) at 10, online (pdf): Library of Parliament <publications.
gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/lop-bdp/ls/392-591-1E.pdf> [perma.cc/VW89-JZT5].
59. The acquisition of citizenship by descent without a substantial connection to the country has
often been criticized: see the discussion of the nuances by Joseph H Carens, “In Defense of Birthright
Citizenship” in Sarah Fine & Lea Ypi, Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and
Membership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 215-221 [Carens, “In Defense of Birthright
Citizenship”].
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Canadian Government intervened in 2006 to aid Canadian citizens fleeing
war in Lebanon, through an operation that cost an estimated $85 million.60
The media at times characterized these individuals in a negative light as
“citizens of convenience,” implying they were benefitting from their status
as citizens without paying taxes61 or maintaining a “significant attachment”
to Canada.62 The first-generation limitation was also introduced within a
years-long period of harsher citizenship rules overall, including around
citizenship revocation.63
3. The 2014 and 2017 amendments
Bill C-37 was followed by two significant amendments to the Act in 2014
and 2017. Bill C-24, An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act and To Make
Consequential Amendments to Other Acts, came into force in 2014.64
The legislation was controversial65 and was repealed almost entirely
by amendments in 2017 by a new government. Bill C-24 expanded
the exception to the first-generation limitation to the grandchildren of
individuals working in the Canadian public service abroad.66 In 2017,
Parliament passed Bill C-6, An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act and
to Make Consequential Amendments to Another Act, under the Trudeau
government elected in 2015.67 It repealed most, though not all, of the
changes to the Citizenship Act resulting from Bill C-24.68 Bill C-6 added
statelessness as grounds for special case grants of citizenship partly in
response to fears around the application of the strict first-generation
limitation.

60. See “Lebanon evacuation cost $85-million: report,” The Globe and Mail (19 September 2006),
online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/lebanon-evacuation-cost-85-million-report/
article1103709/> [perma.cc/SK28-GC5K].
61. Ibid.
62. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 39-2,
Committee Meeting 15, Issue 5 (10 April 2008) (The then-Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Canada emphasized citizenship as requiring “significant attachment”).
63. See Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights, and the Production
of the Alien” (2014) 40:1 Queen’s LJ 1.
64. SC 2014, c 22 [Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act].
65. Liew & Galloway, supra note 18 at 439.
66. Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, supra note 64, s. 2(12).
67. An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to Another Act, SC
2017, c 14.
68. For a detailed analysis on this point, see Julie Bechard & Sandra Elgersma, “Legislative
Summary: Bill C-6: An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to make consequential amendments to
another Act” (8 March 2016, revised 8 February 2018), online (pdf): Library of Parliament <lop.parl.
ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/LegislativeSummaries/PDF/42-1/C6-e.pdf>
[perma.cc/H7DN-N3YB].
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III. Assessing the first-generation limitation
With the development and context provided by the previous sections
in mind, this section analyzes how the first-generation limitation fits
within theories of citizenship acquisition. In our view, while there is a
solid argument against expansive jus sanguinis including indefinite
transmission through one’s parents, the first-generation limitation as
currently formulated is overly restrictive.
1. Indefinite transmission?
While a complete canvassing of citizenship theory is beyond the scope of
this article, we summarize two different theoretical viewpoints here that
are each skeptical to varying degrees of indefinite transmission. The first
by Joseph Carens relies upon jus soli and jus sanguinis to reject indefinite
transmission but to support the acquisition of citizenship at birth to children
born abroad to Canadian nationals where a connection to the country can
reasonably be assumed. The second by Ayelet Shachar set jus sanguinis
and jus soli aside in favour of the principle of jus nexi. This approach also
rejects indefinite transmission by descent, but would allow connection to
be established in individual cases so as to justify acquisition. While there
are nuances across the varying citizenship theories available, these two
approaches are particularly useful to highlight for showing how the firstgeneration limitation as currently constructed fits or fails to fit with the
demands of justice.
2. Jus sanguinis and jus doli and the first-generation limitation
First, Joseph Carens has expressed doubts about indefinite transmission
from parent to child.69 Carens simultaneously argues in favour of automatic
acquisition of citizenship at birth for children of long-term residents.70 For
him, jus sanguinis and jus soli are not mutually exclusive and are both
relevant considerations. Carens claims that citizenship acquisition at birth
is just as i) there is good reason to entitle someone to citizenship in the
polity in which they have significant social and political ties and ii) one’s
birth location or parental nationality are legitimate proxies for a baby’s
likely and eventual socio-political connections.
Carens claims that where a parent was born abroad and spent little or
no time in the country of which they are a national, an assumption that
69. Carens, “In Defense of Birthright Citizenship,” supra note 59 at 215-222.
70. Contrary to Carens, some scholars of course challenge the legitimacy of any acquisition of
citizenship at birth. See Bosniak, “Critical Reflections,” supra note 1. Bosniak acknowledges that
such a view puts theorists in the uncomfortable position of arguing against policies, such as jus
soli citizenship rules in the Americas, that generally work to the advantage of otherwise vulnerable
residents.
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their child does or will have a connection to that country is unconvincing.71
The child’s acquisition of citizenship at birth is therefore unjustified, on
this view. However, he also claims that if the parent has spent a reasonable
amount of time in the country, then there is a strong claim that parental
nationality is a solid proxy for a baby’s likely social and political ties.
Descent is not the only basis for citizenship acquisition in his theory, but
it is an important factor for a just citizenship regime. For Carens, both
unlimited transmissions by descent or a rigid bar against transmission to
the children of parents living abroad are unpersuasive.
Applying Carens’ approach, the first-generation limitation as it exists
is unduly restrictive. It prevents unlimited transmission by descent, which
Carens accepts as legitimate, absent a real connection or a reasonable
and reliable proxy. By preventing acquisition at birth even where a real
connection exists or is likely to develop, however, the current rules
violate his approach to the just transmission of citizenship. Parental
nationality is a useful proxy for Carens of the likely or actual connections
of the child. In our view, Carens’ account encourages us to see the firstgeneration limitation as overly rigid and lacking a contextual assessment
of an individual’s actual or likely connection to Canada. The rule does not
provide for any exceptions, even to those that could demonstrate a genuine
connection or, on Carens’ account, be presumed to have one.
Parliament’s incorporation of an exception for members of the public
service working abroad is a key point to consider. It indicates a legislative
understanding that some offspring excluded by the limitation ought
not to be because their parents maintain a close connection to Canada.
The exception eliminates any harm caused by the rigid rule for public
servants. It would be incongruous if they lost access to certain rights of
citizenship, including transmission to their children, because of the service
they undertake for their country. While relevant, the fact that one’s parents
worked for the Canadian public service abroad does not necessarily
indicate a greater connection to Canada than other factors might. At its
root, the exception shows the arbitrariness in using the parent’s method of
acquiring citizenship at birth as a relevant criterion for the child’s claim.
3. Jus nexi and the first-generation limitation
Second, the theoretical basis for a first-generation limitation of some kind
can also be found in the writings of scholars who advocate for jus nexi
as a more principled and coherent alternative to jus soli or jus sanguinis.
These scholars claim that citizenship acquisition should be calibrated not
71.

Carens, “In Defense of Birthright Citizenship,” supra note 59 at 215-222.
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to “formal criteria,” but “functional and pragmatic” ones.72 Ayelet Shachar
argues, for example, that jus soli and jus sanguinis are arbitrary in the
sense that they both determine citizenship on the basis of specific factors
related to an individual’s birth.73 Linda Bosniak critiques jus soli and jus
sanguinis on a similar basis.74 Circumstances of birth do not necessarily,
on their own, correspond to any predictable or coherent facts about the
individual that should be relevant for citizenship acquisition.
Jus soli and jus sanguinis on Shachar’s view are poor proxies. They are
under-inclusive for excluding some individuals with a genuine connection
to Canada, such as a “resident stakeholder” “who participates in the life
of the polity but lacks citizenship.”75 They are over-inclusive for counting
the “nominal heir” born abroad as eligible for “birthright membership”
through descent.76 While the claim by advocates of jus nexi is against
both jus soli and jus sanguinis, the particular critique of jus sanguinis is
relevant for our purposes. Shachar would exclude on the basis of jus nexi
the second generation born abroad77 or, more broadly, a child born abroad
to parents who have long lost their ties with their country of origin.78
Shachar and others endorsing the principle of jus nexi would favour
the resident stakeholder over the nominal heir.79 Their approach would
expand the opportunities to acquire citizenship for non-citizen residents
of Canada, but decrease the automatic transmission of citizenship for the
children born abroad of non-resident citizens.
The preferred approach of jus nexi advocates is to end indefinite
transmission by descent and instead calibrate citizenship acquisition to
“actual, real, and genuine connection.”80 Here Shachar’s approach is much
more detailed than Carens and searches for actual connections rather
than proxy measures such as parental nationality. According to Shachar,
indicators of such a connection include travel, residency, financial links
such as remittances, which languages are spoken or “intercultural and
political exchange.”81 These criteria are elements that gesture toward the
elusive determination of whether a sufficient connection exists between the
72. Song, “Rethinking Citizenship,” supra note 4 at 15.
73. Shachar, supra note 5 at 165.
74. There is a resonance here with Linda Bosniak’s argument in Bosniak, “Critical Reflections,”
supra note 1 at 343.
75. Shachar, supra note 5 at 165.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid at 116, 122.
79. Song, “Rethinking Citizenship,” supra note 4 at 15-16.
80. Shachar, supra note 5 at 165, 183.
81. Ibid at 173.
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individual and the country. In some circumstances, they will undoubtedly
be less arbitrary and more principled indicia of connection than facts of
birth and descent.
Critics of jus nexi have argued that it might actually end up being
less attractive than the alternatives if applied exclusively and ousting jus
sanguinis and jus soli entirely. Noah Novogrodsky emphasizes that a
genuine connection would have to be established by some bureaucratic
process.82 The introduction of discretion within the bureaucracy around
citizenship acquisition, rather than the clear rule of jus sanguinis, would
inevitably be intrusive. It might even open up the process to manipulation
for exclusionary or ethno-national concerns around who is perceived as
a desirable would-be citizen.83 While this is certainly not the intent of
jus nexi scholars, it may be a real-world consequence during a period of
democratic decline and a resurgence of exclusionary ethno-nationalism
globally.84
Sarah Song argues that whatever its flaws, the venerable tradition of
jus soli is likely to be less intrusive or prone to abuse than jus nexi in some
contexts. She particularly points to the possible acquisition of citizenship
by children born to irregular migrants as a poignant example.85 Patrick
Weil claims that jus nexi would destabilize the status of many individuals
who at present more easily qualify for citizenship under jus soli or jus
sanguinis around the globe. Presentation of a birth certificate would no
longer suffice pursuant to jus soli.86
Weil also argues that the limitation of jus sanguinis by excluding the
“descendants of expatriates”87 misunderstands how citizenship functions.
Citizenship is not just intended to reflect connection, but it also generates
it. He argues that “exclusion of the descendants of expatriates from
citizenship contradicts a new trend: an alliance between the emigrant,
his or her descendants and their state of origin, reflective of new links
between the individual and the nation-state in a globalized world. New
technologies make greater, for the individual, movement within and
82. Novogrodsky, supra note 15.
83. Linda Bosniak, “Status Non Citizens” in Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad &
Maarten Vink, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017)
at 322-323; Bosniak, “Critical Reflections” at 343, 349. See generally Bosniak, The Citizen and the
Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
84. See e.g. the case of Hungary: “A Coup Against Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Hungary”
in Mark Graber, Mark Tushnet & Sanford Levinson, eds, Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
85. Song, “Rethinking Citizenship,” supra note 4 at 16.
86. Weil, “Secured and Sovereign,” supra note 1 at 628.
87. Ibid at 628.
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across borders and, for the state, the expansion of its network.”88 Weil is
arguing that in searching for a single, just principle by which to shape
citizenship acquisition, jus nexi advocates end up with too narrow a vision
for citizenship under globalization.
Our goal is not to attempt to resolve the debate about the relative
merits of jus sanguinis, jus soli, or jus nexi as the preeminent principle
by which to guide citizenship acquisition. We do not wish to elevate one
principle to the exclusion of others. In our view, the harm caused by the
first-generation limitation in its current form to individuals likely to have
or develop real connections to Canada is excessive and needs reform.
Carens, Shachar, and others have highlighted the lack of justice in the
indefinite transmission of citizenship by parents to their children born
abroad. Assuming that there are likely limits on citizenship by descent,
the main issue in our assessment is the mechanisms by which connection
can be assumed or proven so that citizenship is acquired on just terms by
children born abroad to Canadian citizens. Both Carens and Shachar’s
work, in our view, implies that the first-generation limitation as formulated
needs reform.
IV. International comparisons
The restrictiveness of the first-generation limitation is brought to light
by comparison with the equivalent rules in comparable jurisdictions.
Accordingly, this section considers how the United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand, the United States, Germany, France, and Switzerland
address the same issue. The countries have been selected due to either a
similarity with Canada’s regime or due to their notable jus sanguinis rules.
Most of the countries considered in this section have limitations on
citizenship by descent, though there is a range between more and less
restrictive access. Many have variants of a first-generation limitation.
The legislative schemes also tend to contain a degree of flexibility. New
Zealand is the only surveyed jurisdiction which limits citizenship by
descent to the first generation born abroad without a procedure for second
or subsequent generations to acquire citizenship.89 France, on the other

88. Ibid.
89. Citizenship Act 1977 (NZ) 1977/61, s 7; Kate McMillan & Anna Hood, “Report on Citizenship
Law: New Zealand” (2016) at 9, online (pdf): EUDO Citizenship Observatory <cadmus.eui.eu/
bitstream/handle/1814/42648/EUDO_CIT_CR_2016_09.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [perma.cc/
TDE6-RQXK].
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hand, does not place any limits on jus sanguinis.90 The United Kingdom,91
Australia,92 the United States,93 and Germany94 have a means for children
born abroad to acquire citizenship at birth or by application if their parents
are able to demonstrate a connectedness to the country of origin. Germany
and the United States grant citizenship automatically if parental residency
requirements are met at the time of the child’s birth. The United Kingdom
and Australia provide an application process based on parental residency.
The periods of residency stipulated in these regime’s requirements tend to
be modest. Other countries in the sample allow for citizenship by descent
with what can be described as time-limited procedural requirements.
Switzerland95 and Germany96 allow parents to transmit citizenship to
children born abroad so long as the birth is registered, or a retention
application is made by the time the offspring reaches a certain age.97
Canada’s rules on the transmission of citizenship abroad are generally
more restrictive than in the other countries under comparison. Canada
stands out in this sample as lacking a legislative scheme that enables
people born abroad in the second or subsequent generation to demonstrate
their connectedness to Canada and become citizens at birth or by a grant.

90. Christopher Bertossi & Abdellali Hajjat, “Country Report: France” (2013), online (pdf): EUDO
Citizenship
Observatory
<cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19613/RSCAS_EUDO_CIT_
CR_2013_04.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> [perma.cc/XN5Z-4ZKS].
91. See generally Gina Clayton, Oxford Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law, 4th ed (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016) at 73-75, 80.
92. Rayner Thwaites, “Report on Citizenship Law: Australia” (2017) at 19, online (pdf):
GlobalCit
<cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46449/RSCAS_GLOBALCIT_CR_2017_11.
pdf?sequence=1> [perma.cc/7589-F6CB]; Sangeetha Pillai, “The Rights and Responsibilities of
Australian Citizenship: A Legislative Analysis” (2014) 37:3 Melbourne UL Rev 736 at 746; Australian
Citizenship Act 2007, s 16.
93. Peter J. Spiro, “Interrogating Birthright Citizenship” (2013) in Austin Sarat, ed, Special Issue:
Who Belongs? Immigration, Citizenship, and the Constitution of Legality, Studies in Law, Politics,
and Society: vol 60 (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group, 2013); David A Isaacson, “Correcting Anomalies
in the United States Law of Citizenship by Descent” (2005) 47:2 Arizona L Rev 313.
94. Martin Weinmann, “Cutting the Ties? Generational Limitations in Canada’s and Germany’s
Citizenship Laws” (2017) 11:1 Rev European & Russian Affairs 1 at 5.
95. Alberto Achermann et al, “Country Report: Switzerland” (2013) at 4, online (pdf): EUDO
Citizenship
Observatory
<cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19639/RSCAS_EUDO_
CIT_2013_23.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>[perma.cc/Q3HX-VHCN]; Federal Act on the
Acquisition and the Loss of Swiss Citizenship, September 1952, Art 9
96. Kay Hailbronner, “Country Report: Germany” (2010) at 8, online (pdf): EUDO
Citizenship
Observatory
<cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19614/Germany.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [perma.cc/VTR6-RE2W].
97. The process is similar in Belgium: Marie-Claire Foblets et al, “Country Report: Belgium” (2013)
at 4-6, online (pdf): EUDO Citizenship Observatory <cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19603/
RSCAS_EUDO_CIT_2013_27.pdf> [perma.cc/ZG67-Y3L7]; Code de la Nationalite Belge,
(Belgium), art 8(2)(c).
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Country

First
Generation
Limitation

Exceptions for
Children

Test to Meet
Exception 2nd
Generation

Test to Meet
Exception for
3rd Generation

Canada

Yes

No

Regular
naturalization

Regular
naturalization

USA

Residency
requirement
based on
citizenship of
parents and
marriage status

Parental
residency and
spousal status

Parental
residency on
sliding scale
based on
citizenship of
parents and
marriage status

N/A

UK

Yes

Acquisition by
registration;

3 consecutive
years of
parental
residency
without 270
outside

Residence
in UK by
parents for 3
consecutive
years
immediately
prior to
application

Australia

Yes; no
automatic
citizenship by
descent

No application
requirements

2 years of
parental
residency

Same as second
generation

NZ

Yes

Application

Exceptional
or special
circumstances

Same as second
generation

France

No; indefinite
jus sanguinis

N/A

N/A

N/A

Germany

No

N/A

Parental
residency
or birth
registration

Parental
residency
or birth
registration

Switzerland

No

Birth
registration and
submission of
declaration

Birth
registration and
submission of
declaration

Birth
registration and
submission of
declaration

V. Options for reform
This section considers the most plausible options for reforming the
citizenship by descent regime in light of the preceding sections on the
history, comparison, principles of citizenship acquisition, and scholarship.
This article has identified several features of the first-generation limitation
that need to be addressed by any successful reform. The rule is overly rigid
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in restricting jus sanguinis while providing no safety valve for instances
where the limits on transmission by descent result in under-inclusion. The
first-generation limitation assumes descent is an insufficient indicator of
connection to Canada, but does not provide a process for demonstrating a
genuine link to the country. It imposes a cost on Canadians seeking to work
or study abroad. Finally, the differences within the category of “citizen”
that it introduced lead to legitimate claims of tiered or semi-citizenship.
This section specifically considers a parental residency exception, an
adapted naturalization application, and a birth registration exception as
reforms that would address these deficiencies in the current law.
1. Parental residency exception
One of the available options to amend the citizenship by descent regime
is to legislate an exception if a parent who is a citizen by descent has
lived in Canada for a certain period of time. Such a proposal would be
broadly consistent with Carens’ framework. This reform would further the
goal of ensuring citizens born abroad have a substantial link while also
not excluding offspring of parents who have demonstrable connections
to Canada. One way of viewing such an exception is that it combines jus
sanguinis and jus nexi. It limits jus sanguinis, presumably on the basis
that descent is an imperfect proxy for connection, but allows evidence of
a specific type of connection to satisfy the need for a genuine relationship
between the individual and the country required by jus nexi. Rather than
relying on a proxy, such an approach defines specifically what a real
connection is and how it is to be proven.
Beyond the specific context of the first-generation limitation,
residency or physical presence requirements are frequently used as a
legitimate way to determine connection to Canada for various purposes.
Residency is viewed as an effective means of ascertaining connectedness
in the naturalization regime, for example.98 Some taxation obligations also
depend on residence and calculations of the time of physical presence.
A parental residency-based exception to the first-generation limitation
is a viable option in Canada. Ensuring a connection to Canada is an
emphasized benefit of the limitation which would not be lost under this
proposed legislation. A test of time in the country is also much less intrusive
than other potential measures to establish a genuine connection that would
seem necessary, according to advocates of jus nexi. If jus sanguinis is
98. UK, HC Deb (10 March 2016), vol 147, 42-1, no 30 at 1330 (Tony Clement). M.P. Tony Clement
stated in 2016 debates on Bill C-6 in the context of naturalization requirements that “[o]n this side
of the House, we believe that stronger residency requirements do promote integration, a greater
attachment to Canada, and ultimately success in our great country.”
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based on the assumption that descent is a proxy for connection, then actual
time in the country would seem to be at least as functional a substitute.
The rules in comparable countries suggest that the period of physical
presence required ought to be modest. A one to six-year residency
requirement appears appropriate. The requirements could increase based
on how many generations removed the child is from an ancestor born in
Canada, similar to the increased stringency of requirements in the United
Kingdom. For example, the required parental residency could be longer
for a third-generation offspring born abroad than a second. Requiring
that a portion of these years occur after adolescence—as is done in the
United States in some circumstances—is also viable. Maintaining modest
presence requirements in some form would avoid excluding the children
of parents who remain connected to the country.
The drawbacks to this regime are similar to the first-generation
limitation in place. Both places of birth and residency are not necessarily
perfect measures for connection to Canada. As pointed out by advocates
of jus nexi, any formal test rather than a holistic assessment of genuine
connection is likely to be arbitrary to some extent and to be both over-and
under-inclusive in specific instances. Some individuals may be involved
in Canadian organizations abroad and have an identity associated with
the country without the required domestic physical presence period. As a
result, adopting this rule may exclude some individuals who have not lived
in Canada, but retain a significant connection to it. There would also still
be disincentives for some to pursue international careers or studies.
2. Adapted naturalization application
Another feasible option is to provide a means for second or subsequent
generation individuals to apply for a grant of citizenship with less onerous
requirements than under the general procedure. This option recognizes the
pre-existing relationship to Canada that the applicant has through their
parentage. As well, it acknowledges the long-standing role of jus sanguinis
in Canada and the relevance of descent in proving a connection.
Member of Parliament Jenny Kwan proposed a version of this in a
private member’s bill.99 Bill C-333 proposed allowing for citizenship by
descent where an applicant demonstrates their parent has a “substantial
connection” to Canada, and the applicant has spent 1,095 days in Canada
or demonstrates a substantial connection to the country. What is notable
about this proposal is that it places the burden of physical presence or

99. Bill C-333, An Act to Amend the Citizenship Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(Granting and Revoking of Citizenship), 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2016.
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substantial connection on the applicant’s offspring rather than exclusively
on the citizen parent, as is the case in the United Kingdom and Australia.
The three-year residency requirement in C-333 for the grant process
(1095 days) is not overly arduous. As it partially replicates the existing
grant requirements, it appears to be an accepted period of time for one
to establish a connection to Canada, although C-333 would waive the
requirement of pre-existing permanent residency. It would also waive
the requirement that the days of physical presence be in the three years
directly prior to the application.
Placing residency burdens on the applicant is comparable to the
modified jus soli systems in Australia and France, which entitle someone
born in the country to citizenship after certain residency periods. The
length requirements in C-333 would have been longer than those in
Australia, but are identical to those in the United Kingdom. While Bill
C-333’s approach has merit, it is arguably too strict. Requiring both the
parent and the child to demonstrate a substantial connection (or, physical
presence, in the child’s case) is too stringent. A reasonable solution would
be to require either the parent or the offspring to demonstrate a physical
presence or substantial connection in lieu. This brings the amendment
more in line with the international examples.
Such an approach would need to define the meaning of a parent’s
“substantial connection.” In defining a “substantial connection,” the
challenge would be to avoid being overly intrusive or, worse, permitting
abusive procedures of the kind warned about by critics of the tests for
a genuine connection flowing from the jus nexi principle. Moreover, if
poorly implemented, it could potentially introduce criteria that are unfair
or biased, as Novogrodsky, Song, and Weil warn against.
The pre-2009 rules require a “substantial connection” and set out
criteria, but they may be too limited to re-introduce today. Some of the
manners of demonstrating connectedness would benefit from expansion to
acknowledge the various ways in which a Canadian can retain a substantial
connection to the country. For example, the former regulations identified
someone who has worked for the Canadian Government in some capacity
as maintaining a substantial connection. This could be expanded to include
working for a Canadian NGO, company, or organization. As this proposal
does not exclude applicants over 28, it would be fruitful to add criteria that
are less targeted towards youth than the pre-2009 rules.
One potential criticism of the adapted naturalization application is
that it enables people to apply for citizenship at any point in their lives.
Some people may take advantage of this system by acquiring citizenship
while never spending more than a few months in Canada consecutively.
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As is the case in the general grant procedure, adding a consecutive period
requirement, or a maximum age for applicants would solve these issues.
Excluding an age requirement is likely prudent, however, in light of the
noted difficulty the government has in communicating deadlines to those
at risk of not meeting them.
3. Birth registration exception
A further option would be to add in a birth registration exception. Some
countries, such as Germany and Belgium, allow for citizenship by descent
so long as the child’s birth is registered with the appropriate authority
of the country within a certain time frame, or similarly that the parent
submits a declaration of intent for the offspring to gain citizenship. This
option accommodates those wishing for their children to become citizens.
As a result, a benefit of this regime is the parents who retain a connection
to the country are likely to be able to pass on Canadian citizenship to
their children. Connection is partially demonstrated by the parent turning
their mind to the necessary procedure. Further, it would solve the issue of
statelessness flowing from the limitation.
A significant issue in this possible reform is that it may not adequately
address the issues of over- and under-inclusion. For example, knowledge
of a country’s citizenship laws is an indirect measure for connectedness.
It may serve to ensure that politically and legally aware people are able
to pass on their citizenship to offspring born abroad if they so please,
but unintentionally discriminate against people who lack knowledge and
resources. Similar measures have also been criticized in Canada due to
generally low awareness of the rules. The limited timeframe, then, risks
excluding interested applicants. Despite these drawbacks, it would be an
improvement over the existing rigidity of the first-generation limitation.
Conclusion
This article has evaluated the first-generation limitation in Canadian
citizenship law. The indefinite transmission of citizenship by descent raises
challenges for a legal regime underpinned by an emphasis on connection
to Canada. The restrictions on jus sanguinis were controversial at their
introduction in 2009 and despite softening at the edges as a result of
2017 amendments, remain so today. It seems likely that under the current
rules, individuals with Canadian parents and substantial connections to
the country are being arbitrarily excluded. There are a variety of potential
reforms which, in our view, would improve Canadian citizenship laws,
including a parental residency exception, an adapted naturalization
process, and/or a birth registration exception. None of these options can
fully square the circle of how to balance a need for a connection with a
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just and legitimate form of jus sanguinis under Canadian immigration law.
They each have flaws, but ultimately would be preferable to the current
law.

